James v. City of Boise Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 42053 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-16-2014
James v. City of Boise Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
42053
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"James v. City of Boise Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42053" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5583.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5583
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MELENE JAMES, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision of 
the State of Idaho; STEVEN BONAS, 
STEVEN BUTLER, TIM KUKLA, and 
DOES I-X, unknown parties, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Supreme Court No. 42053 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada 
Honorable Steven J. Hippler, presiding 
David E. Comstock 
John A. Bush 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, ID 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
Scott B. Muir 
Assistant City Attorney 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd. 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Facsimile: (208) 384-4454 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...............................................................................••............................. i 
TABLE OF CASES & AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii 
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................•............................. 5 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................... 5 
III. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN A WARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES ................................................................................................................................... 7 
A. This Case Should be Reversed and Remanded for Trial .................................. 7 
B. Respondents Are Not Entitled to Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ........................ 8 
I. Respondents Have Waived Any Right To Claim Fees .......................... 8 
2. Respondents Rely on Case Law which is not Persuasive Precedent 
and a Case that was Vacated on Appeal. ................................................ 8 
C. Respondents Are Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-117 .............. 10 
D. Respondents Are Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-121 .............. 11 
IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 13 
A. Disputed Facts Have to be Evaluated From the Totality of Circumstances 
Perspective Rather than in Isolation ....................................•............................ 13 
B. The Record Before the District Court Raised Substantial Issues as to 
Whether a Reasonably Objective Officer would Believe that a Burglary 
was in Progress .................................................................................................... 19 
C. Ms. James Was Not an Immediate Threat to Police ........................................ 22 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) 
D. Ms. James was not Actively Resisting Arrest. ....................•............................. 24 
E. "Other Factors" Analysis ................................................................................... 27 
F. Qualified Immunity ............................................................................................ 29 
V. ST A TE LAW CLAIMS .................................................................................................. 30 
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................................. 31 
11 
TABLE OF CASES & AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Akiak Native Cmty. v. U.S. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) ....................................... 10 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) ........................................................ 26 
Barryv. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990) ....................................................................... 9 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 
(1978) ........................................................................................................................................ 10 
Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 669,239 P.3d 774, (2010) ....................................................................... 12 
Downeyv. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 166 P.3d 382, (2007) ............................................................ 12 
Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652,666 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................. 9 
Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) ............................................ 8 
Graham v. Conner, 40 U.S. 386 (1986) .................................................................................. 13, 27 
Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002) ............................................................ 12 
Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2000) .................. 30 
Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636,646 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................... 9 
Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................. 10 
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003) ............................................... 8 
Patton v. Cnty. of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) ...................................................... 9 
Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas, 741 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D.P.R. 2010) .................................... 8 
Scottv. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 13 
111 
CASES (cont.) 
Torres-Santiago v. }.funicipality of Adjuntas, 693 F.3d 230 (1st Cir. P.R. 2012) .......................... 9 
Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................... 9 
STATUTES 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 ............................................................................................................................. 9 
42 u.s.c. § 1988 ................................................................................................................... 8, 9, 10 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) ................................................................................................................ 10 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 ..................................................................................................................... 11 
RULES 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54( e )( 5) .................................................................................. 8 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(5) ................................................................................. 8 
lV 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a case where the Court must assess the facts from the perspective of an objectively 
reasonable police officer, under the totality of circumstances available to that police officer, 
Respondent's Brief is based upon mostly isolated facts which are out of context with the required 
legal analysis. When considered in totality and context, the record shows the officers failed at 
numerous points to respond and react in an objectively reasonable manner. The district court 
unfortunately fell into a similar trap, looking at what the officers claimed to have done rather 
than looking at what the reasonably objective officer should have done, given the totality of 
information available to them. For all the reasons stated below, it is respectfully requested that 
this Court reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case so that 
Ms. James may have her day in court on the merits of the factual record present here. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents' statement of facts is remarkable in that it purposefully omits the totality of 
facts known to the officers which, for purposes this case, are critical for context. Accordingly, it 
is necessary to address certain aspects of Respondents' Statement of Facts. 
1. In discussing the observations made by Officer Butler (Respondent's Brief, pp. 1, 
2), the Respondents fail to recognize that the reason he could see Ms. James was because the 
lights to the dental lab were on, they were the only lights on in the building, and that Ms. James 
was still in the same location where she had been seen entering, despite knowing that she had 
been seen entering. If Ms. James was intent on criminal activity, why would she stand around in 
a lit room, knowing that she had been seen, for some 8-10 minutes, while police arrived? A 
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reasonably objective police officer would have to consider these facts, particularly in light of Ms. 
James' statement that she had locked herself out and need to get her keys. 
2. Respondents reference Officer Butler's statement that Ms. James was holding a 
knife and "rummaging" through items on a table. Respondent's Brief, p. 2. However, 
Respondents conveniently omit the fact that Officer's Butler report did not use the words 
"rummaging." Rather, those words came from his deposition. In his report, Officer Butler stated 
that he observed Ms. James holding a beer in her left hand and "manipulating dental 
instruments," including a knife, in her right hand. R. 414. There is a significantly different 
context between the words "rummaging" and "manipulating" and, when one considers that Ms. 
James worked in a dental lab, the fact that she was seen holding and "manipulating" dental 
instruments would hardly be unusual. In addition, the Respondents omit from their statement of 
facts that the alleged knife seen by Officer Butler was never found. 
3. Respondents state that Officer Bonas was advised that the cleaning lady also told 
officers that nobody should be in the building. This statement, according to Officer Bonas, came 
from Officer Barber. Respondent's Brief, p. 2. This creates a significant factual issue because 
Officer Barber testified that the cleaning lady told him that other people, including a female, 
worked in the basement of the dental office. R. 458. In addition, in discovery, Respondents stated 
in an Interrogatory answer that the cleaning lady started to describe what the lady looked like but 
she was cut off because the building ovvner said no one should be in the building. R. 575. 
Officer Barber never testified nor put in his report that the cleaning lady told him that no one was 
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supposed to be building. Thus, given Officer Barber's testimony and report, Officer Bonas 
was not being truthful or was just mistaken. 
4. Respondents' factual statement concedes that no canine warnings or "commands" 
were given until after the decision to use a canine had been made. Respondent's Brief pp. 3, 4. 
Consequently, Respondents necessarily concede that the officers could not use Ms. James' 
failure to respond to those warnings, or commands, as a basis to conclude that she was "actively 
resisting arrest" when the initial decision to use the canine was made. 
5. Respondents state that Dr. Brewster wanted to press charges for the damage that 
Ms. James had done to his building. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Respondents cite to the testimony 
of Sgt. Kukla but do not provide the full context Sgt. Kukla's testimony. Sgt. Kukla testified that 
after the canine attack, and after Ms. James was taken to the hospital, the officers were trying to 
determine exactly who the suspect was and whether she "actually" had a legitimate reason to be 
there. He had a conversation with Dr. Brewster, while still at the scene, and learned that Ms. 
James worked and/or was affiliated with the dental lab. R. 302, 1. 11 - 303, 1. 14. The officers 
were obviously aware, immediately after the attack, that no burglary was in process and they also 
learned that Ms. James was, in fact, the female that the cleaning lady was referring to. 
III. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. This Case Should be Reversed and Remanded for Trial. 
If this Court finds that the district court improperly granted summary judgment, the 
matter will be reversed and remanded for trial and Respondents will not be the prevailing party, 
mooting any further analysis of the attorney fee issue. 
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B. Respondents Are Not Entitled to Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
1. Respondents Have Waived Any Right To Claim Fees. 
Respondents prevailed when the district court granted their motion for summary 
judgment. Judgment was entered on March 4, 2014. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rules 54(d)(5) and 
54(e)(5), Respondents had fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment to submit a motion for 
attorney fees and the legal basis therefore. Respondents failed to do so. The district court has 
not made any findings as who is the prevailing party. While that issue is not presently in dispute, 
the more important fact is that the district court was not given the opportunity to make any 
findings as to whether fees should be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As discussed 
below, Section 1988 requires an explicit finding that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation at the time the complaint was filed for a prevailing defendant to be awarded 
attorney fees. To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the 
court below or the issue must have been raised in the court below. An issue cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) 
(citing McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003)) 
2. Respondents Rely on Case Law which is not Persuasive Precedent and 
a Case that was Vacated on Appeal. 
In arguing that they are entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Respondents rely on 
Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas, 741 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D.P.R. 2010), a case from the federal 
District Court in the District of Puerto Rico. That case, however, was vacated and remanded by 
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the First Circuit in 2012. See, Torres-Santiago v. Municipality of Acijuntas, 693 F.3d 230 (1st 
Cir. P.R. 2012). 
Moreover, Respondents never refer to a Ninth Circuit case which would be the prevailing 
authority on this issue and where the standard for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing 
defendant in a civil rights action is well settled. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes the court to allow a 
reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party in any action seeking to enforce a provision of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. However, the standards are markedly different where a defendant is the 
prevailing party. Under§ 1988 jurisprudence, a prevailing defendant is treated differently than a 
prevailing plaintiff in that fees are not awarded simply because the defendant succeeds. Patton 
v. Cnty. of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 
recognized that attorneys' fees in civil rights cases "should only be awarded to a defendant in 
exceptional cases." Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Herb Hallman 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 646 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing "the well-
established rule that a prevailing defendant should only receive an award of attorneys' fees in 
extreme cases"). 
In determining whether to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant of a § 1983 
claim, a court must evaluate whether the action was "frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation" at the time the complaint was filed. Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 
1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006). An action is frivolous "when the result appears obvious or the 
arguments are wholly without merit." Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007). 
In determining an action's frivolity, a court should neither rely on hindsight logic nor focus on 
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whether the claim was or was not ultimately successful. See, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978). 
Even if "evidence to support a somewhat tenuous theory failed to materialize, and 
summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the defendants," a court may deny attorneys' 
fees where originating circumstances furnish some basis for the claim. Karam v. City of 
Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). "Under this standard, an unsuccessful plaintiff 
who acted in good faith is generally not at risk of having to pay the other side's attorney's fees." 
Akiak Native Cmty. v. US. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Respondents' entire argument to support their claim for attorney fees under federal law is 
that the district court granted summary judgment which meant that Ms. James could not establish 
a prima facie case. Thus, according to the Respondents, they are entitled to award of fees. 
Respondents make no effort to establish their burden that the complaint was frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation at the time it was filed and request that this Court look solely 
and simply at the outcome. Having failed to even recognize the correct burden, it can hardly be 
said that Respondents have, or can, meet their burden to establish a right to § 1988 attorney fees 
which are rarely awarded and typically only awarded in the "extreme" case. 
C. Respondents Are Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
Again, Respondents have waived any right to claim fees. Respondent's did not file a 
motion, nor legal argument, before the district court and seek to side step that requirement here. 
Respondents also fail to identify the proper standard under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) which states: 
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Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a 
person, the state agencv, political subdivision or the court hearing 
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable 
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. (Emphasis added). 
By not seeking attorney fees below, Respondents failed to allow "the court hearing the 
proceeding" to pass on the question of whether the Respondents "acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." While the statute authorizes attorney fees on appeal, there must first be 
some finding below that the action was pursued without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Here, the Respondents make no effort whatsoever to support their conclusory statement 
that Ms. James "failed to introduce any significant probative evidence." They simply point to 
their brief. Of course, Respondents conveniently ignore that they officers misrepresented 
pertinent facts in their reporting of the incident, clearly failed to follow certain aspects of Boise 
Police Department (BPD) policy and procedure, and ignored statements from a completely 
unbiased party (the cleaning lady) who advised the officers that there was a female that worked 
in the basement (dental lab) and started to describe that person only to have the officers cut her 
off. While the district court did not find such evidence probative of much, it certainly does not 
mean that Ms. James offered nothing of significance in defending against the motion for 
summary judgment. 
D. Respondents Are Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 if the appeal was 
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See, Gustaves v. Gustaves, 
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138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). However, Respondents argue that the Ms. James is simply 
inviting this Court to second guess the district court's ruling "on conflicting evidence" because 
she is "dissatisfied with the lower court's factual findings .... " What is apparently lost on the 
Respondents is that it is fundamental error for a district court to make factual findings based on 
conflicting evidence in a summary judgment proceeding. Conflicts in the evidence, at the 
summary judgment level, require resolution by the finder of fact, i.e., the jury. 
Ironically, the cases relied upon by the Respondents are cases where the court was the 
trier of fact. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 669,239 P.3d 774, (2010) was a child custody modification 
proceeding where the magistrate court heard evidence over six days of trial and entered findings 
of fact after post trial briefing. Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 166 P.3d 382, (2007) was a 
boundary dispute lawsuit, tried to the district court, who again issued written findings of fact post 
trial. Neither the magistrate judge in Doe nor the district judge in Downey were required to view 
the factual record, including all reasonable inferences from that record, in light most favorable to 
one party or the other. 
It is curious indeed that the Respondents would apparently concede that the district court 
resolved the "conflicting evidence" in the factual record in their favor and simply because Ms. 
James does not like result she has chosen to appeal. The Respondents' position quite clearly 
supports Ms. James' contention that the district court failed to consider the record in light most 
favorable to her as required by the summary judgment standard of review. 
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A. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Disputed Facts Have to be Evaluated From the Totality of Circumstances 
Perspective Rather than in Isolation. 
Respondents' basic position is that regardless of whether or not factual disputes exist, the 
particular disputes which Ms. James focuses upon are not genuine or material to the analysis. 
However, in making this argument, Respondents fail to appreciate why or how the factual 
disputes would necessarily alter the perspective of an "objectively reasonable" police officer 
under the "totality of the circumstances." 
For example, Respondents contend that whether or not Ms. James was seen breaking the 
window is not material because the mere fact Ms. James broke the window to gain entry, coupled 
with the statement by the building owner that no one should be in the building, supports the 
burglary in progress characterization of Hendryx' (sic) 911 call. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. In 
isolation that may seem true given that there is no real dispute that she broke the window. 
However, the law does not allow for such isolation of the facts. The officers at the scene were 
required to assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not use of force to 
effectuate an arrest was objectively. That assessment included making a determination as to 
whether a burglary was really in progress. See, Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also, Graham v. Connor, 40 U.S. 386 (1986). 
When evaluating the facts under the totality of circumstances, whether or not the facts 
infer that Ms. James broke the window with "criminal intent" is very material. That is because 
whether or not she was actively engaged in the criminal act of burglary is central to the officers' 
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decision to use force to effectuate her arrest. In that context, Officer Bonas wrote in his 
deployment report that a witness saw Ms. James "force entry into the dental office by shattering 
a downstairs window." The words "force" and "shattering" clearly are intended to imply 
criminal intent. However, Officer Bonas chose to omit the fact that Ms. James told the witness 
that she had locked herself out and was going in to get her keys, facts which reasonably infer a 
different intent. R. 363, 801. 
As noted by Mr. Montgomery, Ms. James' expert, and as conceded by the officers in 
charge at the scene - Sgt. Kukla and Lt. Schoenborn - before a choice to use force is made, 
officers have to consider all available information, including assessing and investigating the facts 
at hand. Here, the officers had significant information which should have raised serious doubt 
about whether a burglary was actually occurring. There is, for example, a significant difference 
in the analysis depending on which assumption is made. If one assumes that Ms. James was seen 
"forcing entry by shattering a window," that implies she had the criminal intent to burglarize and 
the assumption is based on incorrect facts. On the hand, if a reasonable officer considers that 
Ms. James was seen entering a lit dental lab and stated that she had locked herself out and 
needed to get her keys, that implies that she may work in the building and that there be a 
different reason, other than burglary, for her actions. While either assumption might have been 
reasonable at the outset, as the facts developed, it should have been apparent to a reasonably 
objective police officer that a burglary was not, in fact, occurring. 
In looking at the severity of the crime issue, the district court never considered how the 
analysis would be impacted if the officers had considered the Ms. James had a right to be in the 
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building just assuming she was engaged in a criminal act. The district court never 
considered the testimony of Mr. Montgomery that a reasonable police officer would have 
seriously questioned whether or not a burglary was in process based on the totality of facts 
gathered by the officers over time. It is worth noting that the district court actually assumed that 
the incorrect statement from Officer Bonas' report was truth as noted by the courts' oral 
comments from the Motion to Reconsider hearing: 
In this case there clearly was probable cause; somebody had been 
seen smashing a window in the basement of the house after hours 
the day after a holiday on a Sunday, at dark. And so I think it is 
quite clear the police had probable cause to believe there was a 
break-in. There was no reason for a tenant to break-in to go into 
the building that way and no reason to assume that that would be a 
tenant going in that way, and so they had probable cause. 
(See, 4/21/14 Tr., p. 16, 11. 14-22).1 
The fact that no one saw Ms. James break the window that led to the dental lab is 
undisputed. Mr. Hendryx denies telling the police officers that he observed Ms. James break the 
window because he did not see that. He testified that when he asked Ms. James if she needed 
help, she stated that she had locked her keys inside. Mr. Hendryx was suspect of her explanation 
but he shared what he had been told with the officers nonetheless. R. 801, p. 6, 11. 2-11. The 
point is that while the officers had a right to be skeptical, a reasonable police officer would not 
simply ignore or discount the information, particularly given the additional information that they 
would learn later. 
1 The district court did not make this mistake in its written opinion. 
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example, the lights in the room where Ms. James entered were on when Ms. James 
was seen by Mr. Hendryx entering through the broken window, a fact that implies she had 
already been in the building. When the officers arrived some 8-10 minutes after the 911 call, 
Ms. James was still in the same location where she had been seen entering, knowing that she had 
been seen entering and the lights were still on. A reasonable police officer would at least 
question why a person intent on committing a burglary would still be in the same location, in a lit 
room, some 8-10 minutes, knowing they had been seen entering the building by someone else. 
R. 682 
Officers learned that the room in the basement where Ms. James entered was a dental lab. 
They learned there was a tenant relationship and they learned that a female worked in the 
basement. Officers could have obtained a description of that person from the cleaning lady. All 
these facts should have led an objectively reasonable police officer to, at the least, question 
whether or not a burglary was occurring versus whether or not the female in the dental lab, who 
was seen "manipulating dental instruments," had a right to be there and had actually locked 
herself out. As noted, the officers found out they were wrong almost immediately after the 
canine attacked Ms. James when they asked Dr. Brewster if he knew who the person was. R. 
302,303. 
The district court was obligated to review the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. 
James. That meant taking the facts stated above, including all reasonable inferences, and viewing 
those in Ms. James' favor. Rather than considering the facts in that fashion, the district court 
became an advocate for the Respondents' position and viewed the factual record in a light most 
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to the police officers. Indeed, despite the fact that Mr. Montgomery's opinions were 
never challenged by the Respondents, and despite the fact that he applied 50 plus years of law 
enforcement experience to his analysis, and stated that reasonable police officers would have 
seriously questioned whet."'1er or not a burglary was occurring, the district court rejected his 
opinions as "unduly favorable" and/or "conclusory." 
A similar analysis is applied to the issue surrounding the alleged PA announcement. 
Again, Respondents suggest that the inconsistent statements by the officers regarding the PA 
announcements are not material because the district court found that they were given. It is Ms. 
James' position that no PA announcements were given, a position supported by the record, and 
therefore a disputed fact. While the district court did conclude, as a matter of fact, that at least 
one PA announcement or warning was issued, it failed to consider the record favorably to Ms. 
James. In this regard, the record reflects: 
1. There is no documentation of any PA warning or announcement. There is no audio of 
any PA announcement. Officer Bonas specifically documented each verbal warning 
that he gave in his deployment report but there is not a single indication that PA 
warnings were also given. In fact, Officer Bonas stated that he gave his "initial" K-9 
announcement at the open door of the dental office, just prior to entry. R. 593. 
2. No other officer documented that PA announcements were given. That includes 
Officer Butler who allegedly gave the PA announcement. R. 414. 
3. Officer testimony about the PA warnings are inconsistent. Officer Butler and Officer 
Barber differ on what patrol car was used for the PA Officer Butler testified that the 
first PA warning was issued at least 10 minutes, maybe 20 minutes, before entry was 
made. However, Officer Bonas testified that he gave the order to issue a PA 
announcement and that he did so after he made a decision to deploy the dog. The 
dispatch report indicates that officers were advised at 6:17:55 p.m. that entry is going 
to be made and a K-9 announcement given. At 6:19:18 p.m. it is reported that the dog 
is away. R. 432,433,411. Moreover, Officer Bonas was not even on scene "10 to 20 
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minutes" before entry was made so there would be no reason to give a PA warning 
because no decision had been made to use a canine. 
4. Mr. Hendryx was in a house across the street. He testified that he never heard a PA 
announcement. While he tempered his testimony by noting that his grandfather had 
installed expensive windows to reduce noise, he conceded that he could hear 
emergency sirens on Cole road which would have been further away than the dental 
office parking lot which was directly across the street. R. 803. 
Officers are required to document important events that occur during an incident. Indeed, 
both Officers' Butler and Bonas agreed that they had an obligation to document significant and 
pertinent events and to create a record of those events in case there are questions raised down the 
road. Officer Bonas, in fact, was required VvTite a deployment report which he conceded was for 
the purpose of justifying the decision to use force. R. 424, p. 26, I. 10 27, l. 4; R. 501, p. 20, 1. 
15-p. 21, 1. 7. 
It is more than reasonable for Ms. James to question whether or not any PA 
announcements were given when there is not a single documented report or audio file reflecting 
that alleged fact. Moreover, Ms. James was entitled under the law to have the district court view 
these facts in her favor. The district court plainly did not do so, finding instead that the record 
was "undisputed" that at least one PA announcement was made. Such fact finding is 
impermissible at the summary judgment stage. 
There is a very simple reason why the issuance of a PA warning is an important and 
genuine issue of disputed material fact. BPD policy states that the decision to deploy a canine 
shall be based on a number of factors, including: 
Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or evading arrest at 
the time. (R. 588). 
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Thus, the issue is whether Ms. James was actively resisting arrest "at the time" the decision to 
use the canine was made because, clearly, that is a decision to use force. Ifno PA warnings were 
issued, or if no canine warnings were issued until after the decision was made. then Ms. James 
alleged refusal to respond to non-existent warnings could not logically form the basis of the 
officers' conclusion that she was "actively resisting arrest." 
Ms. James fully understands that the district court and respondents have focused the issue 
on the time that the canine was ordered to bite and, at that time, Officer Bonas had issued several 
warnings. However, BPD policy is very clear that the decision to use a canine to locate (and 
apprehend if necessary) is a decision to use force. Consequently, all factors must be considered 
at the time the decision to use the canine is made. 
Again, Ms. James was entitled to have the district court evaluate the factual record in a 
light most favorable to her. The district court made a factual finding that there was no dispute 
that at least on PA announcement had been made and it even discounted Ms. James' argument 
regarding the lack of documentation stating that there was "no requirement that officers 
document it." R. 73 7. This reflects, again, that the district court chose to advocate the 
Respondent's position rather than view the facts in light most favorable to Ms. James. 
B. The Record Before the District Court Raised Substantial Issues as to 
Whether a Reasonably Objective Officer would Believe that a Burglary was 
in Progress. 
Respondents' argument that the officers, and the district court, were correct in believing 
that Ms. James was actively engaged in a criminal burglary is based upon a purposefully limited 
recitation of the facts that plainly fails to consider all of the information available to the officers. 
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Respondents' failure to account the "totality of facts" underscores the infirmity of the 
district court's decision because the district court only viewed the facts from a perspective that 
would justify the officers' actions. 
Respondents point only to the following facts to support their argument that the officers 
had a reasonable belief that a "burglary is afoot:" 
On Sunday night after Christmas, James broke a window to a 
closed dental building, crawled through it into the basement, and 
was seen by an officer drinking and rummaging through 
instruments. The 911 caller reported a breaking and entering by an 
intoxicated woman, responding officers observed the broken 
window, and were definitively advised by the building owner that 
no one was supposed to be inside. This was occurring in an area2 
that had recently experienced thefts from other dental offices. 
See, Respondent's Brief, p. 12. 
Much of Ms. James' response to this issue has been addressed above and, while hopefully 
not rehashing that aspect of the brief, it is necessary to again point to the Affidavit of Mr. 
Montgomery which details the fact that the officers had substantially more information available 
to them: 
1. Ms. James was seen entering a dental lab and knew she had been 
seen because she communicated with Mr. Hendryx that she needed 
to get her keys. Ms. James' actions were suspicious but also 
consistent with someone who locked themselves out of the 
building. R. 682, ,i 11. 
2. Officer Butler arrived on the scene and observed the person who 
had been seen entering because the lights were on. He observed 
her drinking a beer and manipulating dental instruments. The lights 
2 This is not an accurate representation of the record. Officer Bonas wrote in his deployment report that he was 
aware of recent burglaries at other dental offices "this month." He said nothing about those purported break-ins 
occurring In the same area. R. 593. 
20 
remained on the entire time. Officer Butler arrived some eight (8) 
minutes or so after the 911 call and the person was still in the same 
place she had been seen entering when he arrived, even though she 
knew she had been seen. In Mr. Montgomery's experience, 
nighttime burglaries into office buildings that are closed typically 
do not involve lit rooms and a reasonable police officer would ask 
themselves why if this person was acting with criminal intent, they 
would still be in the exact location where they were seen entering, 
knowing they had been seen, and then take the time to drink beer 
and use dental instruments, in a dental lab. R. 682, ,r,r 12, 13. 
3. Officers were advised that persons not associated with the dental 
office worked in the building. The officers also learned that a 
female worked in the building. The officers knew the person in the 
basement was female and was seen in the dental lab which was lit, 
and that the female had stated she had to get her keys and then was 
later seen using dental instruments. The officers thus knew that 
there was a tenant relationship, that others had access and the right 
to be in the building, and that the person in the building may be 
someone who worked there. R. 682, ,r,r 14, 15. 
Based upon the totality of circumstances, and his 50 plus years of experience, Mr. 
Montgomery stated that the officers should have seriously questioned whether a burglary was 
occurring and, at the very least, continued to investigate to determine if they could identify the 
person in the basement. They had access to the appropriate people, given that the cleaning lady 
was willing to provide a description and the building owner was there who could provide 
information about the tenants. In fact, as noted, the building owner immediately identified Ms. 
James as someone who worked in the basement as soon as he was given her name. R. 302, 1. 11 
- 303, 1. 14. 
In a bit of irony, Respondents criticize Mr. Montgomery's affidavit as speculative, 
conclusory and not based on the "totality of the circumstances," yet, it is Mr. Montgomery's 
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affidavit that sets all facts in the record which were available to the officers 
rather than the select and isolated set of facts upon which Respondents rely. More importantly, 
Respondents brief does not identify a specific fact or circumstance which was not considered by 
Mr. Montgomery nor do Respondents provide a single example of how or why Mr. 
Montgomery's opinions are "speculative, or conclusory." 
This Court is well aware that affidavits are routinely used, and often required, when 
responding to Motions for Summary Judgment. Here, Respondents never objected to any aspect 
of Mr. Montgomery's affidavit. The affidavit sets forth his qualifications; the affidavit sets forth 
the information which he reviewed; the affidavit sets forth his opinions and the factual basis 
supporting those opinions. It was wholly in error for the district to reject and/or fail to consider 
the opinions of Mr. Montgomery. 
C. Ms. James Was Not an Immediate Threat to Police 
Respondents challenge Ms. James' argument that she was not an immediate threat to 
police, which relied in part on Mr. Montgomery's affidavit, as conclusory. Respondents provide 
nothing more in terms of analysis other than its own conclusory statement. The Court and Ms. 
Ms. James are left to guess why Respondents believe the affidavit is conclusory. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 14. 
Mr. Montgomery's opinion that Ms. James was not an immediate threat to the police 
officers is based on the facts in the record. He notes, correctly, that Ms. James was reported to 
be "lethargic" and "totally out of it." R. 825, Ex. 1. He notes that the officers had information 
which suggested that Ms. James may have had a right to be in the building because she worked 
22 
in the dental lab. R. 575. He notes that Officer Butler reported tJiat was seen "manipulating 
dental instruments." R. 414. He notes that the perimeter of the building was secure, not a single 
officer testified that there was some urgency presented by the situation. R. 431, 466, 482, 545. 
Mr. Montgomery also accounted for the fact that Officer Butler reported that Ms. James was 
"armed" but noted that there was conflicting testimony about whether she was holding a knife, or 
bladed tool ( either of which could have been a dental instrument that she was using in the dental 
lab). Finally, Mr. Montgomery noted that there was no evidence about what Ms. James was 
doing with the knife. 
There is no basis for Respondents' contention that Mr. Montgomery's affidavit is simply 
to conclusory to be admissible. Particularly given that the Respondents can point to no 
affirmative fact in the record which suggests that Ms. James had threatened anybody, acted in a 
manner that was threatening, or appeared capable of causing harm to anyone. Respondents point 
to the fact that Officer Butler reported that she was "armed" with a knife; however, the evidence 
in the record is that he observed Ms. James on a single occasion for "very brief' period of time 
and no "knife" was ever found at the scene. The witness, Mr. Hendryx, testified that he also saw 
Ms. James in the dental lab in the presence of an officer, presumably Officer Butler. Mr. 
Hendryx testified that he did not observe Ms. James holding anything that appeared to be a 
weapon. Moreover, even if she was holding something that appeared to be a knife or bladed 
tool, Officer Butler described her as "manipulating dental instruments." Thus, whatever alleged 
weapon she was holding very well could have been a dental tool that she was using in a dental 
lab. 
23 
The officers claimed that Ms. James was an immediate tl1reat to their safety because she 
was allegedly armed, had tactical advantage inside the building, and was "hiding." Yet, they 
also conceded that the building was secure and that there was no urgency. Thus, any threat that 
she purportedly posed was based on the officers' decision to enter the building. While 
Respondents and the district court are critical of this argument as suggesting that the officers had 
to shirk their duty and wait Ms. James out, that was not Ms. James' argument at all. Rather, as 
reflected by Mr. Montgomery's affidavit, Ms. James argued that given the conceded lack of 
urgency, given that the building was secure, and given the information that the female suspect 
may work in the dental lab, claimed to have locked herself out, and was seen using dental 
instruments, a reasonably objective police officer would have at least investigated further to 
determine if the person in the basement was actually there for legitimate, rather than criminal 
purposes, before deciding to use force. 
Respondents want to ignore that all of these facts even though they turned out to be true. 
Rather than investigate the information they were getting, the decision to use the dog and enter 
the building was made seven (7) minutes after Officer Bonas arrived. The officers chose to 
ignore the facts which have led them to discover that Ms. James had a right to be in the building 
and made a rushed decision to get her out. It was that decision, not any action by Ms. James, that 
purportedly put them in danger. 
D. Ms. James was not Actively Resisting Arrest. 
This factor has been addressed above and, again, there is no intent to rehash the previous 
arguments. For context, however, it is necessary to restate that the sole basis for the officers' 
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belief that Ms. James was actively resisting arrest was failure to respond to warnmgs. 
However, that cannot logically be supported if no warnings were issued before the decision to 
use force had been made. 
Canine use is authorized by BPD policy for building searches where a search by officers 
would create an unnecessary risk. Once the decision to use the canine is made, and before entry 
is made, the canine officer is required to issue a canine warning and allow a reasonable time to 
respond.3 The policy also requires that the warning be repeated on each level of a multi-level 
structure. If there are tactical considerations that prohibit giving a canine warning, the failure to 
give the required warnings shall be documented and explained in the deployment report. R. 588, 
589 (BPD SOP Police Canine (K-9) Units). 
As is clear from the policy, the canine warning is issued before the search commences but 
after the decision to deploy the canine has been made. \Jv'hile the officer may make a decision not 
to unleash the dog into the building, or call the dog back, if a suspect responds to the warning, 
the decision to use force has already been made. Consequently, that decision must be justified 
under the various factors, including whether Ms. James was actively resisting arrest at the time 
the initial decision to use force was made. Neither the district court nor Respondents appreciate 
the distinction. 
The district court also did not accept the undisputed fact that Officer Bonas failed to give 
the required canine warning on the basement level of the structure and that he failed to document 
3 Officer Bonas unleashed the dog into the building 1 minute and 23 seconds after the decision to use the dog had 
been communicated to dispatch and the other officers on the scene. It is unclear how much time elapsed between 
his initial warning and entry but it was necessarily less than the time noted above. Whether that was "reasonable" 
under the circumstances is a question of fact. 
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the reasons for not doing so in his deployment report. Rather, the court found that it was 
"undisputed" that the tactical situation did not allow for a warning to be given on the basement 
level. The district court ignores the policy requirement that the officers "document" and 
"explain" why tactics precluded following policy. R. 761. It is unknmvn whether Ms. James 
would have responded to a warning on the basement level because none was given. There is no 
documentation showing what factual reasons existed for not following the policy. 
Realizing the issue, Respondents now contend that failure to give warnings cannot be a 
basis to challenge the decision to deploy the dog in an excessive force analysis because the 
inquiry is necessarily limited to the time the force is applied. In fact, the Respondents state that 
"an officer's decision [ to deploy] a canine is not, by itself, a use of force. Respondent's Brief, p. 
17. In support, Respondents cite to Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). 
The al-Kidd case does not arise from the use of a police canine to effectuate an arrest nor 
speak to when the excessive force analysis begins or ends. Regardless, it is completely 
disingenuous for Respondents to argue that an officer's decision to deploy a canine is not a use 
of force as it flies directly in the face ofBPD's own policies and procedures which plainly state: 
The deployment of a police canine for the location and 
apprehension of a suspect is a use of force and shall conform to the 
Departments principles for escalation and de-escalation of force 
guidelines as outlined in BPD Policy and Procedures Manual 
1.0100. R. 588. (Emphasis added). 
Officer Bonas testified that taking the dog out of the patrol car to use for a building 
search is a deployment of the dog. R. 508, p. 51, II. 3-25. Thus, when the officers decided to use 
the dog to search the building for Ms. James they made a decision that they were willing to use 
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force to effectuate an arrest and that use of such force was constitutionally appropriate.4 Again, 
while Officer Bonas could have changed his mind for any number of reasons, the fact is that 
once the decision to utilize the canine to search the building was made, as a matter of policy, a 
decision that force was necessary had been made. Accordingly, that decision had to be 
justifiable and consistent \\'1th the Graham v. Connor standards and BPD policy. 
E. "Other Factors" Analysis. 
Ms. James has addressed the issues of warnings, and failure to follow policies and 
procedures, which are relevant considerations in the "other factors" analysis. Ms. James will 
respond to Respondents' contention that they did not need to comply (or did comply) with the 
policy that all tenants be evacuated prior to a building search. 
Respondents argue that they made contact with the building owner and since it was a 
Sunday, the building was closed, and because the owner said no one should be in the building, 
they met their obligations under the policy. Respondents ignore, as did the district court, the 
plain facts that were front of the officers. They knew that there were lights on the basement room 
where Ms. James was seen entering. They learned the area was a dental lab. They learned that 
there was a tenant relationship for the dental lab. They learned that a female worked in the 
basement. To suggest that the officers were reasonable in assuming that no tenant had a right to 
be in the building because it was a Sunday evening and the dentist office on the main floor was 
closed is ridiculous. BPD policy requires that they identify whether there are tenant relationships 
and to evacuate all tenants. 
4 The Court should recall that the canine was trained to bite the first person it came into contact with, with or 
without command. R. 511. 
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out, the officers actually did discover that Ms. had a 
legitimate reason to be in the building almost immediately after Ms. James was arrested and 
taken to the hospital. Sgt. Kukla testified that he spoke with the building owner right after the 
incident to determine "who exactly the suspect was and if she did actually have a legitimate 
reason to be there now that we knew her name." Sgt. Kukla was advised that the dental lab was 
a leased facility and that Ms. James was affiliated with the lab in that she either sub-leased or did 
contract work with the person who leased the space. R. 303, II. 1-10. 
Dr. Brewster was able to tell the officers, after the fact, that the person in the building 
was Ms. James (because he apparently recognized her name) and that she had a legitimate right 
to be there because she was affiliated with the person who leased the space from him. Aside from 
not following policy, the question that is begged is why a reasonably objective police officer 
would not ask the building ffwner that same question before unleashing a canine that is trained to 
indiscriminately bite the first person that it comes into contact with? In fact, why would a 
reasonably objective police officer not ask that question given the information that they already 
had about persons unassociated with the dental practice working in the basement, one of whom 
was a female? 
As stated by Mr. Montgomery, had the police officers followed up and investigated the 
information that they received from the cleaning lady, in light of the other facts that were knovvn, 
it would have been virtually certain that they would have discovered that the person in the dental 
lab was someone who had a legitimate right to be there. R. 684. 
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F. Qualified Immunity. 
At its core, it is Ms. James' contention that there was no objective need to utilize force in 
this case unless and until the officers determined, or at least tried to determine, that the person in 
the basement was not a person who otherwise had a legitimate right to be there. This position is 
supported by the affidavit of Mr. Montgomery and the extensive factual record. 
While the Respondents can, and do, contend that Ms. James had no right to break a 
window to gain entry, if she had the right to be in the dental lab, and if the officers had 
discovered that fact ( or even tried) then the broken window would have been seen exactly for 
what it was. Ms. James, as stated to the witness, had locked herself out and was trying to get 
back in. 
Respondents suggest to this Court that Ms. James has "failed to provide any argument or 
legal support to support her position that the district court erred in finding qualified immunity 
and thus has waived any argument to the contrary. Of course, the Respondent's ignore the fact 
that if the district court applied the incorrect standard of review, impermissibly acted as fact 
finder, rather than viewing the record most favorable to Ms. James, then the finding that no 
constitutional violation occurred, as a matter of law. is necessarily erroneous. Thus, the first 
prong of the qualified immunity argument would fall in Ms. James' favor. 
Second, Respondents ignore the case law and argument provided to the district court and 
this Court which supports the contention that courts should decline to engage in the qualified 
immunity analysis if is necessarily requires wading through the same set of operative facts which 
framed the analysis as to whether there was a constitutional violation. See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 
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60-62; see also, 669 - 672. Lastly, Respondents ignore the very basic and well 
established case law, again cited to the district court and this Court, which states that the law is 
clearly established that were there is no need for force, any force used is constitutionally 
unreasonable. See, Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
If a jury resolves the disputed issues of fact in Ms. James' favor and finds that the police 
officers did not have an reasonably objective basis to believe that a burglary was occurring, did 
not have a reasonably objective basis to believe that Ms. James was an "imminent" threat to their 
safety, and did not have a reasonably objective basis to believe that she was "actively resisting or 
evading arrest", then the jury may legitimately conclude that Ms. James' constitutional rights 
were violated. Moreover, the jury may very well believe that the officers in case had no 
objectively reasonable basis to use any force to effectuate the arrest of Ms. James which means 
that the use of any force was constitutionally unreasonable. There is no reasonable police officer 
who should be judicially blanketed with immunity for not understanding that use of force when 
none is justified is a constitutionally proscribed act. 
V. STATE LAW CLAIMS 
After review of Respondents' arguments on the state law claims, it is Ms. James' belief 
that the issues have been adequately briefed. Further briefing is mercifully unnecessary. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, both in Appellant's Opening Brief, and here, this Court should 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of the case and remand the 
matter for trial. 
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